This paper investigates the effect of network structure on the asset price dynamics. We propose a simple present value discounted asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents. Every period the agents choose a predictor of the future price on the basis of past performance of their own and alternative strategies and form their demands for a risky asset. The information about the performance of an alter- * We thank the participants of the workshop "Ten years of CeNDEF" for their comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to the organizers of the Seventh Trento Summer School in Agent-Based Computational Economics during which we began to work on this paper, for creating stimulating environment and for the opportunity to present our work. We thank Mikhail Anufriev, William Brock, John Duffy, Cars Hommes, Alan Kirman and Marco LiCalzi for their encouragements and suggestions. Authors are responsible for possible errors and omissions. 1 native strategy is available only locally from the directly connected agents. Using the rewiring procedure we produce four types of commonly considered networks: a fully connected network, a regular lattice, a small world, and a random network.
Introduction
To a large extent innovative ideas and practices diffuse in communities through interpersonal communication. Popular ideas in financial markets also often spread through conversations (Shiller, 1995) . In a survey of institutional investors in the USA, Shiller and Pound (1989) found that money managers who invested in stocks with extremely high growth of the price/earnings ratio were often discussing their trades with colleagues. Arnswald (2001) found that among fund managers in Germany information exchange with other financial and industry experts was the second most important factor influencing their investment decisions, which complemented conversations with their colleagues and reports from media. Similarly, a study of fund managers by Hong et al. (2005) provided the strong support for the importance of informal communication. Household investment decisions are also affected by interpersonal communication. Madrian and Shea (2000) and Duflo and Saez (2002) showed that employees are more likely to join an investment retirement scheme if their colleagues have done so. By reviewing data from the Health and Retirement Study, Hong et al. (2004) suggested that interaction with neighbors or church attendance increased the likelihood of a household investing in stocks.
We study the impact that local interactions between investors have on the asset price dynamics. The innovation of our approach is to bring together ideas from three streams of literature: the rapidly developing literature on networks, the literature on heterogeneous agent models, and the literature on agent-based models. We explore a range of local interaction patterns by introducing different types of network topologies into the stylized heterogeneous agent model of Brock and Hommes (1998) .
We find that not only communication influences asset price dynamics, but also the patterns of communication are important because they determine the speed of information exchange. The analysis of the statistical properties of the time series shows that the model with a small world communication structure generates the most realistic asset price dynamics among all other structures studied in this paper.
In the next section we survey heterogeneous beliefs models. The following section examines different network structures and their properties. Section 4 contains the description of the model and its application to the model of Brock and Hommes (1998) . In Section 5 we analyze the model, present and discuss the results of the simulations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Bounded rationality and heterogeneity in asset pricing
The rational expectations theory of finance (Friedman, 1953) asserts that rational investors would drive irrational traders out of the financial markets. Numerous empirical studies, however, showed that successful traders follow a variety of investment strategies (e.g. Frankel and Froot, 1987; Ito, 1990) . DeLong et al. (1990) were among the first who analytically demonstrated that irrational noise traders may survive in the market with fully rational traders. The survival is possible because noise traders bear higher risk which leads to higher returns in the long run. Moreover, heterogeneity of expectations can explain asset prices dynamics. Day and Huang (1990) , Chiarella (1992) , Kirman (1993) and Lux (1995) showed that trades between different agents that follow simple behavioral rules lead to endogenous price fluctuations. Recently Alfarano and Milaković (2009) enriched the Kirman-Lux model with explicit network structures. Brock and Hommes (1998) and Hommes (2001) introduced a structural asset pricing heterogeneous agent model (denoted the BH model henceforth) with an evolutionary switching between several trading strategies. The strategies differed only in the expectation about the future price of the risky asset. The fitness measure of each strategy was freely available to all the agents. The BH model showed that the rational expectations strategies do not necessarily drive out boundedly rational strategies. In fact, both types can co-exist in a market. Despite its complexity, the BH model had a closed-form analytical solution. The model was able to replicate excess volatility, a stylized fact which was not reproduced by the rational expectations models.
To improve the realism of the BH model, Anufriev and Bottazzi (2004) introduced heterogeneous investment horizons, while Anufriev and Panchenko (2006) investigated the changes in the model outcomes due to different market architectures. De Fontnouvelle (2000) enriched the model with various information flow schemes about the dividend payments. Brock et al. (2005) extended the BH model to many trader types, and Hommes (2002) modified the original BH model to reproduce volatility clustering. Hommes et al. (2005) included a market maker into the market pricing mechanism, while Brock et al. (2006) studied how the presence of risk hedging instruments in the form of Arrow securities affects the market dynamics. Boswijk et al. (2007) estimated the parameters of the BH model using annual US stock price data. Chang (2007) enriched the model with exogenous social interactions of the Brock and Durlauf (2001) type. Diks and van der Weide (2005) studied continuous distribution of the agent beliefs, while Gerasymchuk (2008) introduced prospect theory-like preferences of the agents into a modified BH model.
For a detailed survey of the state of the art in the heterogeneous agent modeling see Hommes (2006) .
Another approach used in financial market modeling relies on agent-based models. Agent-based models aim to re-create real stock markets with large populations of interacting artificial agents. Santa Fe artificial stock market (Arthur et al., 1997; LeBaron et al., 1999; Ehrentreich, 2006) is an example of such an approach. Other examples of agent-based models include Gode and Sunder (1997) , Chen and Yeh (2001) , Duffy (2001) . A major advantage of these models over the heterogeneous agent models is that they allow for higher flexibility, richer behavioral assumptions, and more realistic market architectures. This comes at the price of increased complexity. Closed form analytic solutions are typically not available for this class of models and computer simulations are used to analyze them.
For further details on agent-based modeling in finance we refer an interested reader to the review by LeBaron (2006) .
In this paper we combine the rapidly developing literature on networks with the literature on heterogeneous agent models by introducing local interactions into the stylized BH model. Due to high complexity of the resulting system, we lose analytical tractability and have to use agent-based-type simulations to investigate the model. Our aim is to study the effects of different types of local interactions on the asset price dynamics. In our setting the information about the fitness measure of each particular strategy is available to the agents only locally through other agents directly connected to them. We explore a range of local interactions patterns by introducing different types of networks. The analytically tractable BH model is a benchmark to which we compare our results.
Social networks
The analysis by Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Valente and Davis (1999) suggested that a typical social network has the following features (summarized in Watts, 1999) : 1) there are many participants in the network; 2) each participant is connected to a small fraction of the entire network; in other words, the network is sparse; 3) even the most connected node is still connected only to a small fraction of the entire network; that is, the network is decentralized; 4) neighborhoods overlap;
i.e. the network is clustered.
To capture these characteristics Watts and Strogatz (1998) introduced a network p=0 p =1 0<p<1 regular lattice small world random graph fully connected Figure 1 : Network topologies (adapted from Watts and Strogatz (1998) (Davis et al., 2003) , partnerships of investment banks in Canada (Baum et al., 2003) , and many more.
Small world networks emerge when participating agents form networks through a mix of random and strategic interactions (Baum et al., 2003 and Morone and Taylor, 2004) . Figure 1 shows four examples of network topologies. In the fully connected network, all nodes are linked to all other nodes. In the regular lattice, each node is connected to two nodes on each side, that is, each node has 4 connections, or edges. In order to form a small world network an edge is reconnected to a different randomly chosen node on the lattice (avoiding self-and double-connection) with a given rewiring probability, 0 < p < 1. Such rewiring of the nodes continues until all the edges are processed. In the limit when p = 1 the network becomes a random graph. Watts and Strogatz (1998) This is consistent with Albert and Barabási (2002) who suggest that the rewiring probability leading to a small world network is inversely proportional to the number of nodes.
Heterogeneous belief model with local interactions
First, we briefly describe the BH model which we modify to allow for local interactions. 1 There are two assets that are traded in discrete time: a risk-free asset paying a constant gross return R f = 1 + r f and a risky asset paying a stochastic dividend y t at the beginning of each trading period t. The dividend is assumed to be independently and identically normally distributed (i.i.d.) with meanȳ and variance Var[y]. The price p t per-share (ex-dividend) of the risky asset in period t is obtained from the market clearing condition using a Walrasian auctioneer protocol. 2
The wealth dynamics is:
where W t and W t+1 are the wealth levels in period t and t + 1 correspondingly, and z t is the number of shares of the risky asset purchased at date t.
The agents are myopic maximizers of the mean-variance expected utility:
where a is the absolute risk aversion coefficient, and E t and V t denote conditional expectation and conditional variance that are based on the publicly available infor-
The demand for the risky asset of the type h agent is then given by:
Variables E h t and V h t are the expectations (or predictors) of the type h agent about the mean and the variance, respectively. Note that we assume that all the agent types expect the same variance, V h t = σ 2 .
Suppose that the supply of outside shares of the risky asset z s is constant. Let n h t be the fraction of type h agents at date t, and H be the number of trader types in the market. The equilibrium of supply and demand then results in the following pricing equation:
Under the assumption of zero total supply of the risky asset and homogeneous (H = 1) beliefs of the agents, the fundamental price p * is given by the discounted sum of the expected future dividends as a solution to the market-clearing equation (4), which is a well-known result. If, moreover, the dividend process is i.i.d. with constant meanȳ, then p * =ȳ/r f .
We assume that there are two types of traders present in the market: fundamentalists and chartists. The fundamentalist traders forecast the next period price p t+1
to equal the fundamental price p * , that is:
The chartists expect persistent deviations from the fundamental value of the price in the following form:
where a > 0 is a constant and g > 0 is an extrapolation parameter.
The belief types of agents are updated over time depending on the relative satisfaction from following a strategy of a specific type. The satisfaction has observed and unobserved components:
where U h t is the observed performance measure, ε h t is the idiosyncratic noise (we later discuss its source), and β is a coefficient, which controls the intensity of the noise. The observed performance measure U h t is defined as a net profit of strategy h, that is
where p t + y t − R f p t−1 is the excess return earned per unit of the amount of the risky asset z t−1 held in the agents' portfolio at the end of period t − 1, and C h is the cost of following the strategy h. This cost is set to zero for the extrapolating rule of chartists and is strictly positive (set to unity) for fundamentalists.
In the BH model, where every agent knows the performance of both strategies, the dynamics of the model can be described through the co-evolution of the trader type fractions n h t and the market equilibrium price. For a sufficiently large number of the agents, this fraction can be determined by
where P denotes a probability measure. Moreover, if the idiosyncratic noise ε h t in (7) follows the standard Gumbel (extreme value) distribution, by using the discrete choice model of Manski and McFadden (1990) , n h t can be directly expressed as
.
In our setup the agents are located on the nodes of a network and can observe the performance measure of the strategies employed only by those agents who reside on the nodes directly connected with them. Hence, they cannot observe the strategy performance of the traders located two or more edges away. Therefore, contrary to Brock and Hommes (1998) , we do not assume that the performance of every strategy is available to all the agents and we do not use the discrete choice fractions specified in (9). Instead, we allow only for local information exchange in the market. In particular, if an agent is surrounded by the agents of the same type (see Figure   3a ), she does not switch as there is no information about the performance of the alternative strategy. If an agent has at least one neighbor of the different type 3 (see Figure 3b ), she is able to compare the satisfaction from her own strategy U h t with the satisfaction from the alternative strategy U h − t . She switches to the alternative strategy if it performs better. Formally, an agent chooses a strategy h * equal to
We allow for idiosyncratic noise across the agents in the performance measure, as specified by (7). The impact of the noise is inversely related to the intensity of the choice parameter β.
The noise in the performance measure may come from various sources. First, investors' decisions may be influenced by some unobserved factors in addition to the performance measure. These factors may be attributed to the cultural and historical characteristics (see Bond and Smith, 1996 and Hirshleifer, 2001 ) and differ across investors and across time. Second, the noise may be attributed to communication.
We can distinguish two types of noise within this category. One type is attributed to plain noisy information transmission, i.e. under-or over-reporting of profits by neighbors due to behavioral biases. Another type of noise can be attributed to the amount of trust the agents put into the results communicated by their neighbors.
We assume that the noise term ε h t in (7) As we have discussed in Section 3, many studies point out that small world networks are good models for approximating real-life local interactions. In the next section we investigate the implications of introducing small world information exchange into the Brock and Hommes (1998) model. We also compare the effect from the small world network with other basic network topologies. We conduct simulations for four different network structures of local interactions, i.e. for a fully connected graph, a regular lattice, a small world graph with the rewiring probability equal to 0.01, and a random graph (see Figure 1 ). All the graphs are connected, that is, there are no nodes that do not have any edges. and Hommes (1998) model. We analyze the asset price dynamics for N = 1000 agents. We found that for this number of agents fractions n f t are close to the corresponding discrete choice probabilities in (9). 5 For comparison we choose the basic parameter values of the model similar to those used in Brock and Hommes (1998) .
Simulations and results
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1 . As reference points about the performance of the alternative strategy, two agents in our system do not change their types: agent 500 is always a fundamentalist, while agent 0 is a chartist. This is done to prevent the possible extinction of one of the agents' types, which may happen in our model because of the finite number of agents. 6 The periods of the highest concentration of fundamentalists correspond to the time when the price falls to the fundamental level, while the lowest concentration of fundamentalists corresponds to the highest deviation from the fundamental value of the price. Overall, the fraction of fundamentalists is higher in the fully connected network. This is consistent with smaller deviations from the fundamental price and frequent price oscillations. Fundamentalist are uniformly distributed across the network. In the case of regular lattice we observe high clustering of the fundamentalists around the fundamental "core". This is consistent with the high clustering coefficient of this network. In the small world network we also observe clusters, but they are smaller and more disperse in space. Again this is consistent with sparsity and a high clustering coefficient typical for this network. In the case of random graph we do not observe any clusters of the fundamentalists. This is due to a very small clustering coefficient for this network and a relatively small number of the fundamentalists on the market during most of the periods. A comparison of Figure 6 with Figure 8 suggests that the impact of the stochastic dividend on the price is the strongest in the small world and the regular lattice networks.
Evolution of prices and beliefs
The informational efficiency is closely related to the speed of information transmission (or characteristic path length) and can be measured by comparing the volatility of the observed price with the volatility of the fundamental dividend process as suggested by Shiller (1981) . In order to abstract from the effect of timevarying dividend in our model, we keep the dividend process constant. Under this assumption, the Efficient Market Hypothesis would predict constant price over time and zero trading volume. In Figure 9 we analyze the standard deviation of the price (panel a) and the average traded volume (panel b) for values of β ranging from 0.5 to 5 for the four topologies. We ignore the first 2000 transitory iterations and compute the standard deviation of price and the average traded volume for the following 2000 periods. To eliminate the dependence of our results on a particular realization of the random seed, we report averages for 100 simulation runs, each run having its own random seed. The same simulation setup is used for all the other statistics reported further. We observe that the random graph and the fully connected network exhibit the most informational efficient outcomes for any values of β which is consistent with the highest speed of information transmission in these two networks. The regular lattice exhibits the least informationally efficient outcome.
Statistical properties
Below we analyze the properties of the time series generated by the four considered networks. This analysis helps us to understand which network structure generates the time series, properties of which are closer to the stylized facts observed in reality. return distributions with different kurtosis values. The small world network return distribution exhibits the excess kurtosis value close to 5, which is close to the one observed for the returns on the real financial markets.
By computing the autocorrelation of the returns for the four network structures, we can analyze linear unpredictability of the stock returns, which is a well-known property of the time series exhibited by the real financial markets. Figure 11a depicts the autocorrelation of returns for the first five lags as a function of the intensity of choice. Usually the real financial time series exhibit small or no autocorrelation of returns. The regular lattice and the small world network produce high autocorrelations at all lags. This, again, can be attributed to a less efficient information transmission in these networks. Although the random graph and the fully connected network display large autocorrelations at the first two lags, they converge to zero autocorrelation values at lag three to five. The significant positive autocorrelations are resulting predominantly from the persistence of chartists strategies. It is possible to reduce the autocorrelations by adding a sufficient amount of dynamical noise into the price as in Hommes (2002) . However, we do not aim to reproduce stylized facts in this paper and therefore do not pursue this route. Figure 11b shows the correlations between the squared returns and the volume A universal property of the real financial time series is the volatility clustering, i.e., the presence of slow decaying autocorrelations in the squared returns. Figure   12a shows the autocorrelations of the squared returns at the first five lags as a function of β, while Figure 12b shows the autocorrelation function of the squared returns for 20 lags with β = 3.5. The autocorrelations of the squared returns under the fully connected network and random graph vanish after first few lags, which is not consistent with stylized facts. In turn the autocorrelations under the regular lattice and the small world network remain positive and large at many lags for the regular lattice and the small world network indicating the volatility clustering of the returns.
The above analysis reveals that different local interaction arrangements in the market affect the dynamics and the time series properties. The effect of the change in the behavior parameter β also depends on a particular network configuration.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we expanded the model of Brock and Hommes (1998) by introducing local information exchange via communication networks. We studied how different network structures affect asset price dynamics. We observed that the stability region with respect to the intensity of choice parameter β depends on the communication network. A relatively slower information transmission in the regular lattice and the small world networks creates greater information inefficiencies and induces greater instabilities and higher deviations in the price dynamics. Upon the analysis of the statistical properties of the time series of the returns generated by different networks we observed that the asset price dynamics generated under the small world network exhibit some properties close to those observed in the real financial markets.
In many networks there is a feedback between network performance and network formation. This means that the performance of agents also influences the network topology they are active in. For simplicity in this work we imposed the network structure on the agents. Endogenous network formation is an extension which we plan to address in the future work.
